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Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during 
the ‘Great Recession’ 
Maria Rita Testa
1 
Stuart Basten
2 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
Relatively little research has been conducted on how economic recessions impact 
fertility intentions. In particular, uncertainty in reproductive intentions has not been 
examined in relation to economic shocks. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of individuals‟ perception of 
negative changes in both their own and their country‟s economic performance on 
reproductive intentions in Europe during the time of the “Great Recession” (2006-
2011). Crucially, we examine both intentions and stated certainty of meeting these 
intentions. 
 
METHODS 
Using the 2011 Eurobarometer survey for 27 European countries, fertility intentions 
and reproductive uncertainty are regressed on individuals‟ perceptions of past trends 
in country‟s economic situation, household‟s financial situation, and personal job 
situation.  Multilevel  ordinal  regressions  models  are  run  separately  for  people  at 
parities zero and one as well as controlling for a set of socio-demographic variables.  
 
RESULTS 
A worsening in the households‟ financial situation, as perceived in the years of the 
economic crisis, does not affect people‟s fertility intentions but rather the certainty 
of meeting these intentions. This relationship holds true at the individual-level for 
childless people. The more negative the individual‟s assessment of the household‟s 
financial  situation,  the  higher  the  reproductive  uncertainty.  While  this  works 
exclusively at the  country-level for people  at parity one, the higher the share of 
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people‟s  pessimism  on  households‟  financial  situation  in  the  country  the  more 
insecure individuals of such a country are about having additional children.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical evidence suggests that individuals‟ uncertainty about realising their 
fertility intentions has risen in Europe and is positively linked to people‟s perceived 
household  financial  difficulties.  If  European  economies  continue  to  fare  poorly, 
fertility intentions could eventually start to decline in response to such difficulties.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
When asked to estimate their future complete family size, individuals tend to over-
estimate the number of children they will have in their whole reproductive career; 
nevertheless, their lifetime fertility intentions are a strong predictor of their actual 
fertility (Bongaarts 2001; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003; Schoen et al. 1999). 
One of the most important values of reproductive intentions lies in the fact that they 
are informative about directional trends: actual and intended fertility show similar 
trends despite the fact that they are at different levels (Goldstein, Lutz, and Testa 
2003; Hin et al. 2011).  
In this context,  it is surprising that while the recent economic crisis in Europe – 
coined the „Great Recession‟ – has been studied in relation to actual fertility (see, 
among others, Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2011), no analysis of the relationship 
between  the  crisis  and  fertility  intentions  has  yet  been  carried  out.  If  the  recent 
economic crisis has played a role in re-shaping attitudes towards childbearing, either 
through views of individual life courses to come or through a general attitudinal shift 
in the place of family within society, this could affect the anticipated recovery in the 
period Total Fertility Rate [pTFR] after the end of the recession in some countries. 
This could suggest the possibility of an impact upon cohort/quantum fertility.  
Using multilevel models on data from the 2011 Eurobarometer [EB] survey, we 
examine  the  relationship  between  lifetime  fertility  intentions  and  the  
“Great Recession” in 27 EU countries.
3 Individuals‟ subjective evaluations of their 
country‟s  economic  situation,  their  household‟s  financial  situation,  and  their 
personal job situation over the past five years, i.e., 2006‒2011, are used to measure 
people‟s  perceptions  of  their  own  changes  and  their  country‟s  economic 
performance during the time of the “Great Recession” and the impact these have on 
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reproductive intentions. Crucially, we examine both intentions and stated certainty 
of meeting these intentions. 
 
 
2. Background 
2.1 Period fertility rates and the ‘Great Recession’ 
During the 1990s, pTFRs across much of Europe fell to very low levels (Kohler, 
Billari, and Ortega 2002). As Figure 1 demonstrates, most countries generally saw 
an  upturn  in  pTFR  in  the  2000s,  largely  as  a  result  of  the  tempo  effect  of 
postponement of births to later ages (Sobotka 2004). In 2008, for example, pTFR 
was rising in every country in Europe, apart from a marginal decline in Luxembourg 
(Eurostat 2013). However, in all but six EU countries, pTFR either declined in 2010 
or stagnated. Latvia saw the most pronounced decline as the country grappled with 
extremely  high  unemployment  and  a  massive  contraction  of  the  economy.  In 
Hungary,  Malta,  and  Romania  a  transition  from  stagnation  to  decline  occurred, 
while in Bulgaria, Cyprus and, to an extent, Slovakia recent increases sharply turned 
to declines. For most countries, meanwhile, recent increases in fertility turned to 
stagnation  in  2010  (with  the  exceptions  of  Denmark  and  Spain).  Luxembourg, 
Sweden, Germany, Slovenia, Portugal, and Austria each saw modest increases in 
fertility during 2010. Clearly, the relationship between the „Great Recession‟ and 
pTFR in Europe is neither straightforward nor unidirectional.  
 
Figure 1:   Recent trends in pTFR in the EU27 
(a) Eastern Europe      (b) Southern Europe 
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Figure 1:  (Continued) 
(c) Northern Europe      (d) Continental Western Europe 
 
 
Source: (Eurostat 2013) 
 
 
2.2 Relationship between fertility and economic shocks 
The  economic  argument  concerning  fertility  and  recession  is,  fundamentally, 
whether  or  not  the  relationship  is  pro-  or  counter-cyclical.  The  argument  for  a 
counter-cyclical relationship is based upon the assumption that temporary periods of 
unemployment constitute a good time for childbearing as the opportunity costs are 
lower. This, in turn, stems from Becker‟s microeconomic model of fertility (Becker, 
1960;  Becker,  1991).  Here,  childbearing  is  recognised  as  profoundly  time 
consuming, and the associated opportunity costs are closely linked to the potential 
wages  of  the  parents.  Rising  male  wages  produce  an  income  effect  that  raises 
demand for children. For women, rising female wages results in a combined income 
and substitution effect. The income effect raises the demand for children, while the 
substitution effect results in an increased cost of children relative to other goods. In 
this  context,  women  (especially  those  with  high  potential  wages)  may  restrict 
fertility and „trade-off‟ children for less time-demanding alternatives. On the other 
hand, when the substitution effect is diminished for women, perhaps through higher 
rates of unemployment, fertility should – theoretically – increase. 
The most widely quoted empirical evidence for a counter-cyclical relationship 
between fertility and recession concerns the increased birth rates of the United States 
in  the  1960s  and  1970s.  Butz  and  Ward  (1979a;  1979b),  in  particular,  found 
evidence of this  for the early 1970s. However, later research has  suggested that 
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fertility in this period did, in fact, remain largely pro-cyclical (Macunovich 1995). 
Indeed,  a  pro-cyclical  relationship  between  recession  and  fertility  is  one  which 
appears to prevail in the literature. Empirically, this has been found to be the case in 
both long time series (Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2011; Rindfuss, Morgan, and 
Swicegood 1988) and individual country data  (e.g., Adsera 2011; Kravdal 2002; 
Macunovich 1996).  
 
 
2.3 Beyond a relationship between fertility, GDP and individual 
unemployment? 
While GDP growth is the measurement by which recession is technically defined, 
Sobotka,  Skirbekk,  and  Philipov  (2011)  point  out  that  in  terms  of  household 
responses to economic conditions, such fluctuations in GDP are not necessarily the 
best variables to employ. Various studies for both the USA (Becker 1960) and the 
Netherlands (e.g., Fokkema et al. 2008) have examined the relationship between 
consumer confidence and fertility, with each broadly finding that declines in birth 
rates  were  positively  associated  with  trends  in  both  purchases  and  indices  of 
consumer confidence (with appropriate lags).  
Unemployment is generally identified in the literature as a far more tangible 
measurement of the impact of recession upon men and women of reproductive age 
than,  for  example,  GDP  growth  rates.  The  ongoing  low  fertility  rates  found  in 
Southern  Europe  have  been  partly  attributed  to  persistently  high  levels  of 
unemployment and job instability (Adsera 2004; Adsera 2005a; Billari and Kohler 
2004). A negative relationship between unemployment and fertility has been found 
in  a  wide  array  of  studies  across  Europe,  North  America,  and  East  Asia  (see 
Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2011 for a complete review), with many of these 
studies  disaggregating  by  gender  effects  (Örsal  and  Goldstein  2010)  and  by 
individual  and  aggregate  unemployment  (Kravdal  2002).  Other  studies  have 
identified  the  importance  of  unemployment  in  determining  timing  of  fertility  – 
especially the transition to first birth (Meron and Widmer 2002). 
The  association  between  unemployment  and  fertility  is  complex  and 
heterogeneous across age, parity, institutional framework, and length of economic 
shock. In Finland, for example, the economic shock of the early 1990s was met with 
a continuing upward trend in births at parity two and above while first-order births 
were postponed (Vikat 2002; Vikat 2004) – a feature which suggests the possible 
role  of  strong  welfare  states  in  mitigating  the  impact  of  economic  crisis  upon 
fertility.  A  similar  mixed  relationship  has  recently  been  reported  in  Japan  by 
Hashimoto and Kondo (2011) who found that in the period of recession, fertility 
among  college-educated  women  who  entered  the  labour  market  at  the  onset  of 
recession rose, while fertility among secondary educated women and among women Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 23 
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who entered the labour market at the height of recession declined – or, likely, was 
postponed.  
Considering  unemployment  in  the  „Great  Recession‟  in  Europe  we  can  see 
significant fluctuations across both time and space. Indeed, there is clear evidence of 
two distinct „peaks‟ of worsening unemployment in late 2008 and from mid-2011 
(Eurostat 2013). Unemployment has struck parts of Europe with different rates of 
intensity. Of the countries hit hardest by the sovereign debt crisis
4 [hereafter „SDC 
countries‟], Greece, Spain, and Ireland have seen pronounced, constant increases in 
unemployment, with a sharp rise in Italy since 2011 (Eurostat 2013). The Baltic 
States (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) saw a sharp turnaround in 2008 as a result of 
a profound change in economic growth – but each of these appears to have brought 
unemployment back under control. Other new accession countries such as Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Cyprus and Slovenia have seen steady increases in unemployment up to 
around  10%,  while  the  economic  „miracles‟  in  Poland  and  Slovakia  have  been 
halted.  However,  other  large,  Western  and  Northern  economies  have  posted 
relatively modest increases in unemployment. Germany, indeed, returned a constant 
decline  in  unemployment  over  the  period  of  the  crisis.  Turning  to  youth 
unemployment, the picture appears even starker. Among young people (aged below 
25) in 2011, unemployment rates in Greece and Spain hover around 45% with a 
further six countries  – Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia  – 
around  30%  (Eurostat  2013).  This,  of  course,  is  difficult  to  judge  in  relation  to 
impacts on fertility. 
However,  there  is  an  argument  to  be  made  that  the  consideration  of 
unemployment/employment as a binary variable in relation to childbearing choices 
and attitudes could be inadequate. As Emmenegger et al. (2012a) and others have 
observed,  the  changing  nature  of  the  European  labour  market  over  the  past  five 
decades has led to increased fragmentation and „dualisation‟ between „insiders‟ who 
are characterised by protected „jobs for life‟ and „outsiders‟ whose employment is 
precarious  and  vulnerable.  This  process  has  come  about  through  the  creeping 
deregularisation  and  liberalisation  of  employment  contracts  with  a  concomitant 
increase  in  „atypical  employment  contracts‟  such  as  fixed-term  contracts  and 
(sometimes  involuntary)  part-time  employment.  It  is  important  to  observe  that 
women and young people are particularly affected by this transition towards „non-
standard‟ employment (Emmenegger et al. 2012a). In other words, the nature of 
„being  employed‟  has  changed  dramatically  over  the  past  40  years  –  and  is  an 
entirely different experience in different parts of Europe. As we suggest later, this 
means that the perception of national economic performance and the likely role of 
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the  individual‟s  trajectory  within  that  could  be  just  as  critical  in  shaping  views 
regarding major life decisions as present individual employment status.  
Yet, this notion of the „dualisation‟ of the labour market is just one element of 
what Mills and Blossfeld (2005) observe to be the onset of increased uncertainty, 
especially  for  the  young.  For  them,  the  process  of  globalisation  has  led  to  a 
heightened  degree  of  uncertainty  for  those  early  in  the  life-course  through  the 
„endogenous intensification of innovation, increasing rate of economic and social 
change‟;  acceleration  of  market  transactions  and  the  increasing  volatility  of  the 
market.  Before  impacting  micro-level  „rational  decision-making‟,  however,  they 
argue  that  this  generalised  uncertainty  is  „filtered‟  by  institutions  such  as 
employment systems, education systems, welfare regimes, and family systems. With 
regard to employment and education, timing and ease of labour market entry, levels 
of unemployment and, crucially, stability and security of employment are defined by 
Mills  and  Blossfeld  as  key  structural  and  institutional  'filters'.  Meanwhile,  the 
provision  of  „safety-net‟  welfare  policies  and/or  active  employment  sustaining 
policies as well as contemporary attitudes towards the norms of family formation are 
also crucial. These, in turn, affect micro-level decisions regarding employment (type 
of job), partnerships (type and timing), and parenthood (timing). 
Strongly related to this is Giddens‟ sociological conception of „Risk‟ and Ulrich 
Beck‟s (1992) notion of the „Risk Society‟ – that „one of the major consequences of 
modernisation  has  been  a  tremendous  intensification  of  real  and  perceived  or 
socially mediated risk‟ (Hall 2002: 175). In other words, for Beck and Giddens, „risk 
has become strategic organizing principle guiding both individual and institutional 
thinking  and  action  in  contemporary  society‟  (Hall  2002:  175).  Over  time,  the 
modernisation of the family has assured that risk has been generally transferred to 
the individual, and given that the typical individual routinely encounters „a world of 
open social possibilities, ambiguity and contested risk knowledge‟  (Lupton 1999: 
65) the reflexive negotiation of this risk is a critical, ongoing activity of modern 
humans. Linking this back to demographic change, Hall (2002) hypothesises that 
any increases in (perceived) personal or societal „risk‟ will result in lowering fertility 
intentions, later entry into relationships and greater prevalence of co-habitation – 
each as a means of reducing (or postponing) assorted dimensions of interpersonal 
risk.  
Within this broad pattern of increasing uncertainty (or „risk‟), clearly eras of 
increased uncertainty will exist – such as in times of economic crisis. According to 
Breen  (1997),  this  “temporal  uncertainty”  reduces  attractiveness  of  long-term 
commitment and increases that of „contingent asymmetric commitment‟. In relation 
to employment, if such economic shocks exaggerate the economic uncertainty of 
already uncertain labour market positions this is likely to further inhibit the making 
of long-term commitments – such as parenthood – which require a secure economic 
basis.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  necessary  „minimum‟  level  of  economic Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 23 
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security – what Rindfuss and van den Heuvel (1990) call an „affordability clause‟ – 
is even less likely to be met in such straitened times. A development of this would 
be the „demand‟ theory of fertility which posits that childbearing, as a process of 
consumption of psychological, financial, and time resources which could be spent by 
parents  elsewhere,  can  be  foregone  or  delayed  in  straightened  economic  times 
(Brewster and Rindfuss 2000).  
Finally, in a Durkheimian (1893[2002]) sense, economic crisis and uncertainty 
can lead to anomie, or a breakdown in social norms. This can influence fertility 
outcomes through both micro- and macro-level mediators. Increased levels of stress 
and anxiety (Dooley, Fielding, and Levi 1996; Fenwick and Tausig 1994) associated 
with anomie can result in depression and poor health (Schneiderman, Ironson, and 
Siegel 2005) while, again in the context of a „Risk Society‟, heightened levels of 
anomie  may  make  people  averse  to  additional  risks  such  as  those  surrounding 
childbearing (Philipov 2002). Finally, the corollary of an effect of anomie within the 
„demand‟ theory context is that in societies where a desire for „quality‟ children has 
developed (Becker 1991), couples may forego or delay childbearing because of a 
sensed loss of control over the environment in which the child would grow up.  
In  sum,  a  broad  theoretical  generalisation  assumes  that  in  the  context  of 
increased „temporal uncertainty‟ coupled with the underlying shift towards greater 
overall economic uncertainty, people – especially the young – are „less able to make 
long-term binding commitments  which  may translate into…foregoing partnership 
and parenthood until they feel they have obtained adequate certainty for their future 
life  path‟  (Mills  and  Blossfeld  2005:  18).  This  is  likely  to  translate  into  an 
empirically  observed  pro-cyclical  relationship  between  periods  of  „enhanced 
uncertainty‟  –  characterised  as  economic  shocks  or  recession  –  and  childbearing 
behaviour.
5  
As Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov (2010) observe, „the impact of uncertainty 
in the developed countries has been addressed in relatively few empirical studies‟ 
meaning that „the wealth of theoretical arguments has not yet been properly tested‟ 
(p.18). Despite this, and returning to our theme of looking beyond a binary notion of 
employment,  a  number  of  important  studies  have  suggested  that  labour  market 
position, unstable or temporary work does, indeed, have a detrimental effect on both 
                                                            
5 On the other hand, it has been suggested by Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa (1994) that childbearing 
could serve as a strategy as minimising „biographical uncertainty‟ regardless of the nature of „economic 
uncertainty‟. Referring to the US in the 1990s, Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa (1994) suggest that „the 
impetus for parenthood is greatest among those whose alternative pathways for reducing uncertainty are 
limited  or  blocked.  […]  Having  a  child  changes  life  from  uncertain  to  relatively  certain.‟  In  this 
„uncertainty reduction‟ hypothesis (characterised, for example, by Bernardi, Klärner, and von der Lippe 
(2008) and Vikat (2004), women with poor prospects in the labour market have an elevated risk of first 
birth  as  they  seek  uncertainty  reduction  by  motherhood  which,  they  perceive,  will  bring  „order  and 
stability to the life-course‟ (Vikat 2004: 6). 
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fertility (e.g., Adsera 2005b) and fertility intentions (e.g., Pailhé 2009). Returning to 
our  „dualisation‟  theme,  for  example,  Adsera  (2005b)  finds  a  marked  contrast 
between public sector jobs characterised by security and benefits being associated 
with  faster  transition  to  motherhood  as  opposed  to  short-term  contracts  being 
associated with delayed fertility. Stepping back to broader notions of uncertainty, 
Ranjan (1999) suggested that the declining fertility in Central and Eastern Europe in 
the 1990s was an „optimal reaction‟ to income uncertainty during the economic and 
political restricting of the era. For East Germany, studies by Bhaumik and Nugent 
(2006) found a U-shaped association between self-assessed employment uncertainty 
and  fertility  with  women  in  the  middle  presenting  the  lowest  likelihood  of 
childbearing.  Meanwhile,  studies  by  Kreyenfeld  (e.g.,  2009)  found  that  neither 
„subjective‟ nor „objective‟ measures of uncertainty significantly altered first birth 
rate, but that this did have strong educational differentiation with women with higher 
levels  of  education  postponing  parenthood  when  subject  to  employment 
uncertainties  and  women  with  lower  levels  of  education  often  responding  by 
becoming  mothers.  Perelli-Harris  (2006)  found  that  childbearing  desires  and 
outcomes in Russia were strongly, positively linked to subjective well-being among 
married women with at least one child. As we show in Section 3, our study attempts 
to add to the literature by explicitly linking perceptions of economic uncertainty 
mediated  through  perceptions  of  future  individual  and  societal  economic 
performance to changing patterns of reproductive uncertainty.  
 
 
2.4 The ‘Great Recession’, fertility, and perceptions of uncertainty 
Going beyond a causal link between unemployment and fertility and turning to the 
likely  role  of  „enhanced  temporal  uncertainty‟  and  the  perception  of  worsening 
personal and/or societal conditions, it is crucial to understand the changing nature of 
the  particular  frameworks  –  or  possibly,  to  coin  Mills  and  Blossfeld‟s  (2005) 
expression,  the  „institutional  filters‟  –  which  mediate  increased  uncertainty  and 
micro-level decision making during the „Great Recession. 
As well as direct increases in unemployment, the exaggerated rise of short-
term, fragile employment and the wider context of the „dualisation‟ of the labour 
market has further weakened employment systems. Furthermore, in the context of a 
free international labour market within the European Union, international migration 
can be a further particular response to economic  uncertainty  which, in turn, can 
create an ever greater pool of „outsiders‟ in fragile employment (Emmenegger et al. 
2012b).  Welfare  regimes  have  been  widely  affected  by  the  process  of  fiscal 
consolidation taking the form of tax rises and austerity  drives  –  with alternative 
emphases on each element in different settings. Austerity, and what Emmenegger et 
al. (2012a) call the „demise of the redistributive capacities of social policies‟ are Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 23 
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potentially very important in the extent to which they impact a wide array of support 
mechanisms surrounding the family. These range from direct contributions through 
family policy initiatives and other welfare provisions to the impact upon a declining 
number of jobs and opportunities in the public sector. These changes in government 
expenditure have been negative – and are projected to be deeper – in many settings 
across Europe, but especially in those most affected by the sovereign debt crisis 
(The  Economist  2012).  In  sum,  there  are  many  processes  beyond  objective 
individual-level variables (such as unemployment) and macro-level variables (such 
as GDP per capita) which could have an impact on the sense of uncertainty felt by 
individuals.  
 
 
3. Research hypotheses  
To better understand the impact of economic uncertainty on fertility, we look at the 
relationship between economic crisis and individuals‟ reproductive decision-making 
which  plays  an  important  role  in  shaping  fertility  outcomes  (Morgan  2001). 
Individual and societal attitudes and norms surrounding families and partnerships 
are an important mediator in the relationship between economic context and fertility 
outcomes. As Schoen et al. (1999) observe, „fertility is purposive behavior that is 
based on intentions, integrated into the life course, and modified when unexpected 
developments  occur‟  (p.799).  As  such  we  would  expect  economic  shocks  –  as 
unexpected  developments  –  to  create  some  modification.  A  focus  on  fertility 
intentions rather than simply on fertility is very critical, because a decline in fertility 
rates  during  the  economic  crisis  would  not  give  us  insights  on  whether  fertility 
intentions have just not been realised, or the birth intentions have actually changed.  
Moreover,  there  is  currently  relatively  little  research  which  explicitly  links 
economic  and  social  uncertainty  and/or  unemployment  and  economic  shocks  (as 
distinct from general income variation) to fertility intentions (e.g., Philipov, Spéder, 
and  Billari  2006;  Spéder  and  Vikat  2005).  Linked  to  economic  uncertainty, 
reproductive  uncertainty  is  a  further  crucial  factor.  We  know  that 
uncertainty/certainty in fertility intentions plays an important role in defining and 
shaping  fertility  outcomes  (e.g.,  Bernardi,  Cavalli,  and  Mynarska  2010;  Morgan 
1981),  but  again  the  relationship  between  economic  shocks,  unemployment  and 
uncertainty in fertility intentions has been very little explored in the literature. Here, 
we study this relationship by using individual‟s perception of the economic situation 
of the country in which they reside, their household‟s financial situation and own 
personal job situation. The reason of giving emphasis on these perception variables 
is that, arguably, the perception of the crisis can be of higher relevance than the 
crisis  per  se  in  shaping  individuals‟  birth  plans.  This  is  supported  by  research Testa and Basten: Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the great recession 
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showing the fertility responses to changes in consumer confidence (Fokkema et al. 
2008). Moreover, whereas a persistently bad economic and employment condition 
does not necessarily produce low fertility intentions, because material aspirations 
and  child  quality  requirements  are  correspondingly  weakened,  a  low  relative 
economic  situation  is  more  likely  to  do  so.  Negative  trends  would  lead  to  a 
substantially lower economic condition than the person has been used to. Thus, we 
expect  that  a  perceived  worsening  in  the  personal  job  situation  and  household‟s 
financial  situation  has  a  negative  effect  on  individual‟s  fertility  intentions 
(Hypothesis  I  a)  and  a  positive  effect  on  individual‟s  reproductive  uncertainty 
(Hypothesis I b).  
Country  aggregate  perceptions  of  an  individual‟s  personal  job  and  a 
household‟s financial situation may have significant effects on top of individuals‟ 
own  perceptions,  because,  even  if  one‟s  personal  job  and  household‟s  financial 
situation has not worsened, the fact that a person sees that the situation has worsened 
for  many  other  people  in  the  country  makes  him  worry  about  his  own  future 
situation.  In  other  words,  a  widespread  negative  social  climate  may  strengthen 
people‟s doubts about whether having a(nother) child at all, with the consequence 
that lifetime fertility intentions are reduced. Thus, aggregate negative assessments of 
people‟s past job situation and the household‟s financial situation are hypothesised 
to be negatively correlated with an individual‟s fertility intentions (Hypothesis II a) 
and positively correlated with an individual‟s reproductive uncertainty (Hypothesis 
II b). 
Finally, for the same reasoning we expect that people positively assessing the 
past country‟s economic situation are more prone to report a preference for larger 
family sizes and less likely to be uncertain about realising their reproductive plans 
(Hypothesis III). 
The fact that the assessment of the change in a country‟s economic situation, 
the household‟s financial situation, and personal job situation were related to the 
years in which the economic recession started to be experienced in several European 
countries allows us to use them as a proxy measure of the effects of the crisis and to 
investigate this effects in relation to fertility intentions and reproductive uncertainty.  
 
 
4 Data and methods 
4.1 Selected sample 
The multilevel analysis was conducted on a sample of 27 European countries based 
on the 2011 Eurobarometer survey. The stratified sampling procedure assures nearly 
equal probability samples of about 1,000 respondents aged 15 or above in each of Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 23 
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the countries (with the exception of Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus  which  had 
smaller sample sizes of 500 individuals). The sample size allows us to make equally 
precise  estimates  for  small  and  large  countries,  as  well  as  to  make  comparisons 
between sub-groups broken down by sex, age, education, marital status, and so on. 
The  survey  used  a  single  uniform  questionnaire  design,  with  particular  attention 
being paid to equivalent question wording across languages. The format was face-to-
face interview. 
Our analytical sample consists of 5,652 men and women aged 20 to 45 who 
answered the question on fertility intentions, including 3,556 childless respondents 
and 2,096 respondents with only one child (Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix). In 
the analysis of reproductive uncertainty the samples sizes are smaller,  i.e., 2,581 
childless respondents and 1,029 respondents with one child, because certainty levels 
of intentions were asked only to individuals reporting positive fertility intentions 
(i.e., one or more children). Hence, the study of reproductive uncertainty at high 
parities (i.e., two and above) was precluded by the limited sample size of people 
reporting an intention to have a third or higher birth order child.  
Although  missing  answers  may  be  symptomatic  of  particular  fertility  plans 
(Morgan 1981, Morgan 1982), individuals who did not report any valid answer for 
their intended family size (non-response rate was around 12%) were excluded due to 
the  lack  of  auxiliary  information  on  this  item  and  in  order  to  avoid  potential 
complications. 
The  multilevel  models  are  formally  based  on  two  levels:  individuals  and 
countries  referred  to  as  “clusters”,  as  described  in  Tables  A2-A4.  Though  the 
hierarchical  structure  is  quite  unbalanced,  this  is  efficiently  handled  by  using 
maximum-likelihood methods. Furthermore, the number of clusters and their sizes 
are  sufficient  to  achieve  high  levels  of  power  and  accuracy  of  the  asymptotic 
distributions of the estimators (Snijders and Bosker 1999) and thus allow for reliable 
inferences. 
 
 
4.2 Response variables  
Measuring childbearing intentions can present challenges, as intentions encompass 
several  dimensions.  The  first  distinction  is  between  intentions/plans  and 
ideals/desires: the number of children an individual intends/plans to have may not be 
the same as the number of children individuals would ideally like to have given no 
constraints.  A  second  distinction  is  made  between  lifetime  intentions  (so-called 
child-number intentions or quantum intentions) and short-term intentions (so-called 
child-timing  intentions  or  time-dependent  intentions),  which  are  parity-specific. 
Lifetime fertility intentions refer to the number of children individuals want to have 
over the whole life course and short-term intentions refers to a short-term framework Testa and Basten: Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the great recession 
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to  which  the  intentions  are  confined.  A  third  distinction  is  made  between 
childbearing intentions and the degree of certainty about those plans, which has been 
found to act as a strong predictor of future fertility behaviour (Schoen et al.1999; 
Westoff and Ryder 1977).  
In this analysis the response variables are the number of additionally intended 
children  and  the  certainty  attached  to  the  probability  of  realising  the  stated 
childbearing intentions. Economic recession may also affect child-timing intentions, 
but the EB data do not contain information on the time of other relevant life events 
(such as, for example: leaving parental home, entering a partnership, age at birth of 
the first child) to which child-timing intentions could be usefully related.
6 The lack 
of knowledge on the life course stage in which individuals are observed  prevents a 
correct interpretation of the timing of childbearing, both actual and intended  as well 
as its comparison through time based on several EB rounds. For this reason we just 
focus on child-number intentions. 
Lifetime fertility intentions  are coded as a four-category variable: zero, one, 
two, and three or more children. Values greater than or equal to three were, in light 
of their low frequency, collapsed into a single category. The  variable is surveyed 
through the following questionnaire item: “How many (more) children do you intend 
to have?” This prospective item  comes immediately after the question about the 
number of children already had (“How many children, if any, have you had?”) and is 
clearly intended to provide information about the number of births respondents plan 
to have over (the rest of) their reproductive careers. Neither of the above-mentioned 
questions asked the interviewed people to make a distinction between biological and 
adopted children.  
Certainty about fertility intentions is measured through the following question: 
“How certain are you that you will have the number of children that you have just 
mentioned?” Response options are: “very sure”, “fairly sure”, “not very sure”, and 
“not  at  all  sure”.  The  related  variable  takes  four  categories  reflecting  the  above 
mentioned response options. Importantly, only respondents who provided a valid 
numerical  answer  other  than  “0  child”  to  the  question  on  additionally  intended 
number of children were asked about certainty level.  
The  choice  to  examine  separately  lifetime  fertility  intentions  and  certainty 
about those intentions has been motivated by the purpose to disentangle the effects 
of the „Great Recession‟ exerted only on the quantum of fertility intentions from 
those exerted only on the certainty attached to intentions. In reading the results one 
should keep in mind that certainty is confined to people reporting positive fertility 
plans. 
                                                            
6 The only information that can be used in a dynamic perspective is the age at completion of the study, 
which is available in the data. Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 23 
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The questions on actual and additionally intended number of children, as well 
as the certainty of intentions, were asked also in a previous round of the EB survey 
conducted  in  2006.  They  were  formulated  by  using  exactly  the  same  question 
wording  and  they  appeared  in  exactly  the  same  order  in  the  two  surveys‟ 
questionnaires (in 2006 and 2011), allowing for a comparative analysis over time of 
lifetime fertility intentions and certainty. 
 
 
4.3 Explanatory variables 
Individual assessments of their country and their own economic situation over the 
past five years (i.e., 2006–2011) are used to estimate the effects of the economic 
crisis. Focusing on past rather than just current economic trends is in line with the 
relevance of relative expectations according to which a sudden deterioration in the 
economic situation is of higher importance than a bad economic situation because it 
frustrates earlier or well defined aspirations and expectations (Easterlin 1980).  
These assessments are measured through the following question: “Compared 
with five years ago, would you say things have improved, worsened or stayed about 
the same when it comes to ...?” Response options are: „better‟ „worse‟ „same‟ „don‟t 
know‟.  Out  of  15  items  listed  in  this  survey  question  we  selected  the  country 
economic situation, the household financial situation, and the personal job situation. 
Each  of  these  was  included  in  the  models  as  a  dummy  variable  indicating  a 
worsening in the specific situation. Perceptions of household‟s financial situation 
and personal job situation were considered at the individual as well as at country-
level.  
The  individual-level  explanatory  variables  include  age,  sex,  enrolment  in 
education, level of education, marital status, employment status, and self-location on 
the  social  scale.  All  of  the  covariates,  which  were  selected  because  they  are 
considered relevant predictors of fertility intentions in the literature, refer to the time 
of the interview.  
The age of respondents is continuous and centred on the rounded mean value of 
33 years. The other covariates, if categorical, are transformed into suitable dummy 
variables. Some collapsing of the categories was often needed: in such cases, several 
alternative  collapsing  schemes  were  tried  in  the  model  selection  process.  In  the 
following, the covariates are described using the categorisation adopted in the final 
models. The marital status takes four categories: single, married, cohabiting, and 
separated. The last category also includes divorced respondents, while the married 
respondents are grouped together with the remarried people. The educational level is 
a three-category variable with low (up to 15 years), medium (between 16 and 19), 
and high (20 years or above) level of education. This categorization reflects the 
grouping available in the Eurobarometer data. A dummy variable indicating whether Testa and Basten: Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the great recession 
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respondents  were  still  enrolled  in  education  is  also  considered.  Education  is 
measured in the EB survey through the following survey question: “How old were 
you when you stopped your full-time education?” The employment status has three 
categories:  employed,  unemployed,  and  people  not  in  the  labour  market.  An 
interaction  term  between  gender  and  not  being  active  in  the  labour  market  was 
included in the models to take into account that most of the women not participating 
into the labour force are actually housewives, while among men not being active in 
the  labour  market  is  mainly  related  to  an  inability  to  work  or  retirement  status. 
Unfortunately, if respondents were unemployed at the time of the survey, we were 
not  able  to  make  a  distinction  between  long-term  and  short-term  duration  of 
unemployment spells. The self-positioning on the social scale is a variable measured 
on  ten  point  values,  one  for  the  lowest  level  and  ten  for  the  highest  level.  A 
description of all the explanatory variables is reported in Table A1 of the Appendix 
(panels a and b). 
 
 
4.4 The models 
The multilevel analysis relies on the random intercept version of the proportional 
odds model for ordinal responses (e.g., Agresti, 2002). In the model presented below 
      denotes  the  response  variable  of  individual  i  of  cluster  (i.e.,  country)  j  
(                           and  ij x  is  the  corresponding  vector  of  covariates, 
including  both  individual-level  and  cluster-level  variables.  Moreover,  j u  denotes 
the cluster-level error term, also called random effect. Throughout the analysis we 
made the standard assumptions on random effects, namely: (i) the random effects are 
independent  and  identically  distributed  following  a  normal  distribution  with  zero 
mean  and  an  unknown,  estimable  variance    
  ;  (ii)  the  random  effects  are 
independent of the covariates.
 7 
When the response  variable is ordinal, taking the  values        , one can 
define    
(      (             and  adopt  the  random  intercept  proportional  odds 
model, which can be viewed as a set of linear models for the M-1 cumulative logits: 
 
                                                            
7 The  assumption  that  the  random  effects  are  independent  of  the  covariates  is  analogous  to  the 
independence assumption on the error terms usually made in standard linear regression. However, it 
should be noted that the independence assumption concerning the random effects is not as stringent as it 
may  appear,  as  Snijders  and  Bosker  (1999)  show  that  if  the  random  effects  are  correlated  with  an 
individual-level variable, such correlation is removed as soon as the cluster mean of such variable is 
introduced as a further covariate. Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 23 
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where   is  the  intercept, β  is  the  vector  of  regression  coefficients  and 
() m   are 
the cutpoint parameters. The cutpoints must be ordered, 
(1) (2) ( 1) ...
M   
 , and the 
first  cutpoint,
(1)  ,  is  fixed  to  zero  for  identifiability  reasons.  The  minus  sign 
preceding  the  linear  predictor  is  necessary  in  order  to  interpret  the  effects  of  the 
covariates in the more natural way (i.e., a positive regression coefficient means that 
higher values of the covariate tend to yield higher values of the response variable). 
The assumption that the vector of regression coefficients β  is constant for all 
the  M-1  cumulative  logits,  sometimes  called  the  parallel  regression  assumption, 
leads to the proportional odds property, i.e., the ratio of the odds of two individuals 
does  not  depend  on  the  category.  The  parallel  regression  assumption  is  very 
convenient for parsimony and interpretation, and can be checked using, for instance, 
the test developed by Brant (1990).  
Since  the  individual-level  variance  implied  by  the  logit  link  is 
2 /3  ,  the 
intraclass correlation coefficient is   
2 2 2 / /3 uu      for the proportional odds model 
(Snijders and Bosker 1999). 
We  used  ordinal  regression  model  because  both  the  intended  number  of 
children and the certainty of realising fertility intentions are measured on an ordinal 
scale. These models could be extended to handle partial proportional odds, but then 
the  interpretation  becomes  somewhat  tortuous.  We  tested  the  parallel  regression 
assumption,  and  because  only  a  few  covariates  in  each  model  violated  such  an 
assumption  –  and  only  slightly  –  the  proportional  odds  multilevel  models  were 
preferred. The significance of the variances of the random effects was assessed with 
the likelihood ratio test with corrected p-value, which has been found to be more 
reliable than the Wald test. 
The models were run separately for the childless sub-sample and individuals 
with one child, following the approach suggested by  the rational choice theories 
(Yamaguchi  and  Ferguson  1995)  and  a  conditional-sequential  fertility  decision-
making (Namboodiri 1972). The parity specificity of fertility intentions has been 
largely emphasised in previous research (Ajzen and Klobas 2013). The intention to 
have  a  first  child  marks  a  crucial  transition  in  one‟s  life  course  –  transition  to 
parenthood  –  whereas  intentions  to  have  subsequent  children  are  qualitatively 
different  and  strongly  affected  by  the  experience  of  parenthood  (Dommermuth, 
Klobas, and Lappegard 2011). We restricted the analysis to people at parity zero and 
one, because at parity two (and higher) there were too few people who reported the 
intention to have  an additional  child and  for  which the  information on  certainty 
would have been available (certainty was not asked to people reporting no child as Testa and Basten: Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the great recession 
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intention). If we are aware that this is a restriction in the scope of the analysis, we 
are  also  reassured  by  the  fact  that  young  people,  who  are  presumably  at  the 
beginning of their reproductive careers, are also the group most severely exposed to 
the negative consequences of the economic downturn (Kravdal 1999; Neels 2010). 
The hierarchical structure of the data used in the multilevel analysis is described in 
Table A4. 
 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive findings: fertility intentions and reproductive uncertainty in 
2006–2011  
Intended family size of people of reproductive ages decreased in Europe between 
2006 and 2011. The change is statistically significant for Greece as well as for the 
EU27 as a whole in the sub-sample of childless people. In the EU27, the mean 
values went from 1.7 in 2006 to 1.59 in 2011 among childless people and from 1.76 
in 2006 to 1.71 in 2011 among people with one child (Table 1). Around half of the 
EU countries registered a decline in lifetime fertility intentions. At parity zero, the 
decrease was relatively high in Greece, the United Kingdom, Poland, Cyprus, and 
Sweden (each -0.20) but statistically significant only in Greece. At parity one, the 
decline is statistically significant in Bulgaria (-0.46), and Latvia (-0.30). Austria, 
which shows the lowest lifetime fertility intentions in both the survey rounds (1.55 
and 1.68, in 2006 and 2011, respectively), recorded an increase of about 0.4 children 
for people at parity zero. In Estonia and Latvia the trend was also on the rise, +0.33 
and +0.26, respectively, among childless people. At parity one, no marginal positive 
temporal  changes  in  fertility  intentions  concerned  Spain  and  Estonia  (+0.2) 
(Table 1).  
Focusing on the „SDC‟ countries, results point out that the decrease in lifetime 
fertility intentions is statistically significant only among childless Greeks (-0.29). In 
Portugal and Italy the decline was of a lesser extent (-0.11 and -0.12, respectively, at 
parity zero, and  -0.09 and -0.01, respectively, at parity one) and not statistically 
significant, while in Spain an increase was recorded which is statistically significant 
for people at parity one (+0.20). Ireland has seen a substantial stability of its lifetime 
fertility intentions over the observed period (Table 1).  
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Table 1:  Mean ultimately intended family size of people aged 20 to 45, 
EU27. Years 2006 and 2011. 
   Parity zero 
 
Parity one   
   2006  2011  Diff. b-a 
 
2006  2011  Diff. d-c   
 
a  b 
   
c  d 
 
 
Austria  0.83  1.25  0.42  *  1.52  1.45  -0.07   
Belgium  1.72  1.58  -0.14 
 
1.83  1.72  -0.11  * 
Bulgaria  1.85  1.87  0.02 
 
1.96  1.50  -0.46   
Cyprus  2.41  2.18  -0.23 
 
2.25  1.67  -0.58   
Czech Rep.  1.62  1.64  0.02 
 
1.60  1.65  0.05   
Denmark  1.96  1.82  -0.14 
 
2.13  2.03  0.10   
Estonia  1.75  2.08  0.33 
 
1.84  2.06  0.22   
Finland  1.93  1.79  -0.14 
 
2.00  1.74  -0.26   
France  2.07  1.90  -0.17 
 
1.97  1.93  -0.04   
Germany  1.37  1.38  0.01 
 
1.43  1.55  0.12   
Greece  2.03  1.74  -0.29  *  1.76  1.69  -0.07   
Hungary  1.75  1.62  -0.13 
 
1.82  1.64  -0.18   
Ireland  1.92  1.94  0.02 
 
2.23  2.27  0.04   
Italy  1.58  1.46  -0.12 
 
1.57  1.56  -0.01   
Latvia  1.59  1.85  0.26 
 
2.02  1.72  -0.30   
Lithuania  1.85  1.94  0.09 
 
1.66  1.83  0.17   
Luxembourg  1.51  1.45  -0.06 
 
1.40  1.62  0.22   
Malta  1.50  1.55  0.05 
 
1.71  2.01  0.30  * 
Netherlands  1.49  1.51  0.02 
 
1.84  1.78  -0.06   
Poland  1.94  1.73  -0.21 
 
1.68  1.62  -0.06   
Portugal  1.59  1.48  -0.11 
 
1.53  1.44  -0.09   
Romania  1.31  1.50  0.19 
 
1.51  1.53  0.02   
Slovakia  1.57  1.69  0.12 
 
1.56  1.60  0.04   
Slovenia  2.01  2.11  0.10 
 
1.74  1.68  -0.06   
Spain  1.54  1.65  0.11 
 
1.56  1.76  0.20   
Sweden  2.02  1.82  -0.20 
 
1.87  1.95  0.08   
UK  1.79  1.50  -0.29 
 
1.78  1.94  0.16   
 
             
 
EU27  1.70  1.59  -0.11  *  1.76  1.71  -0.05   
 
Note: For people at parity zero, the mean ultimately intended family size is the mean additionally intended family size. For 
people at parity one, the mean ultimately intended family size is obtained by summing up the mean actual and the mean 
additionally intended family size. EU27 mean values are weighted by taking into account the country population size. A T-
test of the differences in means between 2006 and 2011 was performed. Differences statistically significant (at 5%) are 
marked with an asterisk. Sample sizes are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.  
Source: authors’ elaborations based on Eurobarometer 2006 and 2011 
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Uncertainty in meeting the reported intended family size increased in Europe 
between 2006 and 2011. Sixteen of the 27 EU countries registered an increase in the 
share of people reporting uncertainty at parity zero, fewer countries (i.e., twelve) 
recorded a similar trend at parity one. In the EU27 as a whole, the temporal change 
is  statistically  significant  only  among  childless  people,  while  no  substantial 
differences were observed among people with one child. At parity zero, the increase 
is statistically significant in Ireland, Greece, Spain, the United Kingdom, Romania, 
and Slovakia. At parity one, the increase is statistically significant only in Greece 
and Portugal (Table 2).  
Focusing on the „SDC‟ countries and the childless sub-group, the rise was +22 
and +21 percentage points in Greece and Ireland, respectively, and +15 and +14 
percentage points in Spain and Portugal, respectively. Positive changes of a bigger 
extent concerned people at parity one: +28 percentage points Portugal, +25 Greece, 
and  +21  Spain,  Ireland  recorded  an  increase  of  just  7  percentage  points. 
Surprisingly, in Italy the proportion of uncertain people was stable at parity zero, 
while it decreased from 42% in 2006 to 11% in 2011 at parity one. A statistically 
significant temporal decline in reproductive uncertainty was observed also in other 
EU countries: Malta, among people at parity zero, and Finland and Cyprus, among 
people at parity one (Table 2).  
 
Table 2:  Share of people aged 20 to 45 who are uncertain about realising 
their reproductive plans, EU27. Years 2006 and 2011. 
   Parity zero 
 
Parity one   
   2006  2011  Diff. b-a 
 
2006  2011  Diff. d-c   
 
a  b 
   
c  d 
 
 
Austria  36  33  -3 
 
17  27  10   
Belgium  43  47  4 
 
29  14  -15   
Bulgaria  31  29  -2 
 
39  39  0   
Cyprus  28  36  8 
 
33  0  -33   
Czech Rep.  54  54  0 
 
50  45  -5   
Denmark  19  36  17 
 
11  31  20   
Estonia  29  27  -2 
 
17  31  14   
Finland  23  32  9 
 
39  10  -29  * 
France  41  52  11 
 
26  36  10   
Germany  37  40  3 
 
18  18  0   
Greece  37  59  22  *  16  41  25  * 
Hungary  66  61  -5 
 
37  46  9   
Ireland  45  67  22  *  24  31  7   
Italy  35  35  0 
 
42  11  -31  * 
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Table 2:  (Continued) 
   Parity zero 
 
Parity one   
   2006  2011  Diff. b-a 
 
2006  2011  Diff. d-c   
Latvia  36  35  -1 
 
36  48  12   
Lithuania  25  39  14 
 
25  23  -2   
Luxembourg  41  24  -17 
 
26  10  -16   
Malta  94  55  -39 
 
0  52  52   
Netherlands  54  50  -4 
 
50  43  -7   
Poland  28  23  -5 
 
36  33  -3   
Portugal   29  43  14 
 
15  43  28  * 
Romania  20  43  23  *  37  28  -9   
Slovakia  59  77  18  *  42  42  0   
Slovenia  15  26  11 
 
9  11  2   
Spain  43  58  15  *  21  42  21   
Sweden  36  56  20 
 
30  30  0   
UK  26  48  22  *  20  27  7   
 
             
 
EU27  37  45  8  *  32  30  -2   
 
Note: Proportions of people who report to be unsure (either not very sure or not at all sure) to have as many children as they 
intend to have. EU27 proportions are weighted by taking into account the country population size. A T-test of the 
differences in means between 2006 and 2011 was performed. Differences statistically significant (at 5%) are marked with 
an asterisk. Sample sizes are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
Source: authors’ elaborations based on Eurobarometer 2006 and 2011 
 
 
5.2 Individual’s, household’s, and country’s economic situation in 2006–2011  
Views of the economic recession are consistent with Europeans‟ general pessimism 
about the past, current, and future economic situation of their country and their own 
households,  which  is  conducive  to  higher  uncertainty  in  general,  and  to  higher 
reproductive uncertainty. The country past economic trend was perceived negatively 
by the large majority of the people: In 15 out of the 27 EU countries the share of 
pessimism was 80% or above. Only in four countries, Sweden, Germany, Austria, 
and Poland, were the percentages below 50%. On average, three of four Europeans 
were concerned about the economic situation of the country observed in the past 
five-year period. At the top of the rank is Greece, with almost all people expressing 
negative  opinions,  followed  by  Spain,  Ireland,  and  Portugal  with  percentages  of 
around 90% (Figure 2, Panel a).  
Greek women and men of reproductive ages were also particularly concerned 
about their household‟s financial situation: 72% of Greek women and men reported 
a worsening in their household‟s financial situation over the past five years, similar 
percentages were considerably lower in all the other EU countries. They were just Testa and Basten: Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the great recession 
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slightly above 50% in Ireland and Portugal, and 29% and 42%, respectively, in Italy 
and Spain. In Lithuania, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Latvia shares 
were  close  to  50%,  while  in  the  rest  of  Europe  less  than  half  of  people  of 
reproductive  ages  expressed  a  pessimistic  view  about  household‟s  financial 
conditions (Figure 2, panel b).  
The past personal job situation was negatively assessed by 30% of Europeans 
of reproductive ages. Once again, Greece is placed at the top of the country ranking 
with values above 50%, followed by Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, and Latvia, with 
percentages close to 50%. Focusing on the „SDC countries‟, in Ireland, Spain, and 
Portugal people‟s pessimism about their job situations registered a share of about 
40%, while in Italy a similar percentage is less than 30% (Figure 2, panel c).  
 
Figure 2:  Share of people of reproductive ages (20-45) perceiving a 
worsening in country’s economic situation, household’s financial 
situation, and personal job situation over the past five years 
(2006-2011), EU27. 
  a)  Perception of a worsening in country’s economic situation,  
2006-2011 
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Figure 2:  (Continued) 
  b)  Perception of a worsening in household’s financial situation,  
2006–2011 
 
  c)  Perception of a worsening in personal job situation, 2006–2011 
 
 
Source: authors’ elaborations based on Eurobarometer 2011  
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5.3 Multilevel analysis of fertility intentions  
We have observed a decline in fertility intentions and an increase in reproductive 
uncertainty in Europe in the years 2006-2011. We have also shown that people‟s 
assessment of the country‟s economic situation, their household‟s financial situation, 
and their own job situation in the same five-year period has been quite pessimistic. 
In this section, the relationship between these two phenomena is examined using 
multilevel models. The multilevel analysis is focused on fertility intentions in 2011 
rather than the changes occurred in 2006-2011, because the two EB cross-sections 
(2006 and 2011) do not allow us to trace changes in fertility intentions and related 
uncertainty at individual level.  
Random intercept ordinal regression models were used to regress additionally 
intended  number  of  children,  and  reproductive  uncertainty,  on  country‟s, 
households‟, and individuals‟  past economic situation  by  controlling for  a set of 
socio-demographic variables. Four different models were estimated separately for 
the childless sub-sample and the people with one child: empty models (Model I), 
models with only perception variables (Model II), models with all individual-level 
covariates (Model III), and full models with individual- and country-level covariates 
(Model  IV).  Country  means  of  individuals‟  perception  of  household  financial 
situation and personal job situation are included because individuals may well be 
influenced by the general negative social climate in the country even though they are 
not very pessimistic when assessing their own household‟s financial situation and 
job situation.  
The left panel on Table 3 reports the estimates of the random intercept ordinal 
regression models run on the childless sub-sample. As can be seen, the household‟s 
financial situation is negatively correlated with people‟s fertility intentions. But the 
association  is  statistically  significant  only  in  Model  II  including  just  the  three 
perception variables, while it becomes not statistically significant in full Models III 
and IV. As far as the other two perception variables are concerned, they are both 
negatively correlated with fertility intentions but the perceived country economic 
situation  never  has  a  statistically  significant  effect,  while  the  perception  of  job 
personal situation is statistically significant only in Model II. Looking at Table A5 
depicting  the  estimates  of  several  models  in  which  the  socio-demographic 
backgrounds have been gradually included, it becomes evident that the effect of 
individuals‟ perception of the past household‟s financial situation is mediated by the 
individuals‟ employment status and self-positioning in the social scale. As soon as 
these two covariates are added in the models, the effect of the household financial 
situation loses its statistical significance. 
The right panel on Table 3 reports the estimates of the random intercept ordinal 
regression models run on the sub-sample of people with one child. As seen for the 
childless  people,  the  effect  of  the  perceived  household‟s  financial  situation  is Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 23 
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negatively  correlated  with  fertility  intentions.  This  effect  is  highly  statistically 
significant in Model II, but it becomes only weakly statistically significant (at 10% 
level)  in  full  Models  III  and  IV,  and  the  magnitude  of  the  related  coefficient 
decreases from -0.41 in Model II to -0.23 in Models III and IV. The procedure of 
gradual inclusion of the socio-demographic variables in the model points out that the 
relationship between fertility intentions and people‟s worries about their household 
financial situation is mediated especially by people‟s self-positioning in the social 
scale (Table A5). 
To sum up, people‟s perception of a worsening in their household‟s financial 
situation  is  the  most  relevant  predictor  of  fertility  intentions  among  the  three 
perception variables, but its  negative effect on fertility intentions is mediated by 
individuals‟ backgrounds, such as: employment status and – especially at parity one 
–  self-positioning  in  the  social  scale.  Interaction  terms  between  a  perceived 
worsening in their household‟s financial situation, on one side, and age, employment 
status, and education, on the other side, have been tried but not retained in the final 
models shown in Table 3 as they were not statistically significant. This result seems 
to suggest that the effect of this perception variable on intentions does not change by 
education, age, and employment status.  
The  socio-demographic  background  variables  that  have  a  statistically 
significant effect on lifetime fertility intentions are: age, education, marital status, 
and  employment  status,  and  social  status.  In  particular,  intentions  are  positively 
associated with educational level, being enrolled in education, and positioning in the 
social scale, while they are negatively associated with age, being female, single, 
separated, or inactive. These predictors influence the reproductive intentions of both 
childless people and people with one child; however, being single or separated, and 
having a high level of education are statistically significant only at parity one, while 
being inactive is statistically significant only at parity zero, and its effect  is  not 
gendered, as indicated by the lack of the statistical significance of the interaction 
term (Table 3).
8 Similarly, we could not find support for the fact that the  effect of 
unemployment on fertility intentions is gendered (Rindfuss et al. 1988). As such, the 
interaction term (unemployment*female) was not retained in the final model.  
The country-level variance goes from 0.16 in the empty  Model I to 0.11 in the 
full Models III and IV and it is statistically significant in all four models,  for both 
parity zero and parity one, which supports the choice of using a random intercept 
version  of  the  ordinal  regression  model.  A  random  slope  for  the  perceived 
household‟s financial situation has been considered in the analysis. The likelihood 
ratio test comparing the fitting of the two nested models (one with just a random 
intercept and one with a random intercept and a random slope) indicated that the 
                                                            
8 This interaction term was the only one retained in the final models although not statistically significant 
to control for the fact that being inactive identifies different categories for women and men: inactive 
women were mainly housewives and inactive men were mainly retired or unable to work. Testa and Basten: Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the great recession 
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random intercept model fits the data better than the model containing also a random 
slope.  This  finding  reveals  that  the  effect  of  a  perceived  worsening  in  the 
household‟s financial situation on fertility intentions does not vary from country to 
country within the EU.  
 
Table 3:  Estimates from the random intercept ordinal regression models 
on lifetime fertility intentions. Beta coefficients, EU27. 
 
Parity zero: level one units: 3496, level-two units: 27  Parity one: level-one units:2053, level-two units:27 
 
Model I    Model II    Model III    Model IV    Model I    Model II    Model III    Model IV   
Individual’s perception of a worsening in: 
           
   
       
Country econ. 
situation 
- 
 
-0.04    -0.05 
 
-0.06 
 
- 
 
0.04    -0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
      (0.08)    (0.08)    (0.08)        (0.11)    (0.12)    (0.12)   
Household fin. 
situation 
- 
 
-0.20  *  -0.12 
 
-0.14 
 
- 
 
-0.41  ***  -0.23  +  -0.23  + 
      (0.09)    (0.09)    (0.09)        (0.11)    (0.12)    (0.12)   
Personal job 
situation 
- 
 
-0.31  ***  -0.05 
 
-0.05 
 
- 
 
0.02    0.05 
 
0.04 
 
      (0.09)    (0.10)    (0.10)        (0.11)    (0.13)    (0.13)   
Other individual-level variables   
           
   
       
Age-33 
(average) 
- 
 
-    -0.15  ***  -0.15  ***  - 
 
-    -0.17  ***  -0.17  *** 
          (0.01)    (0.01)            (0.01)    (0.01)   
(Age-33)^2  - 
 
-    -0.01  ***  -0.01  ***  - 
 
-    -0.01  ***  -0.01  *** 
          (0.00)    (0.00)            (0.00)    (0.00)   
Male (reference) 
   
   
           
   
       
Female   - 
 
-    -0.21  **  -0.21  **  - 
 
-    -0.61  ***  -0.60  *** 
          (0.08)    (0.08)            (0.10)    (0.10)   
Married 
(reference) 
 
 
   
           
   
       
Cohabiting  - 
 
-    0.09 
 
0.09 
 
- 
 
-    0.15 
 
0.19 
 
          (0.09)    (0.10)            (0.13)    (0.13)   
Single  - 
 
-    -0.11 
 
-0.11 
 
- 
 
-    -0.34  *  -0.30  + 
          (0.10)    (0.09)            (0.17)    (0.17)   
Separated  - 
 
-    -0.25 
 
-0.25 
 
- 
 
-    -0.83  ***  -0.81  *** 
          (0.27)    (0.27)            (0.20)    (0.20)   
Low education 
(reference) 
       
           
   
       
Medium 
education 
- 
 
-    0.01 
 
0.01 
 
- 
 
-    0.26 
 
0.26 
 
          (0.15)    (0.15)            (0.17)    (0.17)   
High education  - 
 
-    0.17 
 
0.19 
 
- 
 
-    0.78  ***  0.78  *** 
          (0.15)    (0.15)            (0.18)    (0.18)   
Enrolled in 
education 
- 
 
-    1.30  ***  1.31  ***  - 
 
-    1.72  ***  1.72  *** 
          (0.25)    (0.25)            (0.44)    (0.44)   
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Table 3:  (Continued) 
 
Parity zero: level one units: 3496, level-two units: 27  Parity one: level-one units:2053, level-two units:27 
 
Model I    Model II    Model III    Model IV   Model I    Model II    Model III    Model IV   
Employed (reference)                               
Unemployed   -    -    -0.16    -0.16    -    -    0.15    0.15   
          (0.11)    (0.11)            (0.15)    (0.15)   
Inactive  -    -    -1.15  ***  -1.15  ***  -    -    -1.09  +  -1.09  + 
          (0.22)    (0.22)            (0.56)    (0.56)   
Inactive * 
Female 
-    -    0.25    0.26    -    -    1.05  +  1.06  + 
          (0.16)    (0.16)            (0.56)    (0.56)   
Pos. in the social 
scale  
-    -    0.09  ***  0.09  ***  -    -    0.07  +  0.06  + 
          (0.02)    (0.02)            (0.03)    (0.03)   
Country-means of perceptions                           
Household fin. 
situation 
-    -    -    1.92  +  -    -    -    -0.84   
              (1.14)                (1.39)   
Personal job 
situation 
-    -    -    -1.18    -    -    -    1.30   
              (1.33)                (1.59)   
First cut-point  -1.47  ***  -1.65  ***  -1.06  ***  -0.71  *  -0.11    -0.22    -0.33    -0.27   
  (0.09)    (0.23)    (0.23)    (0.28)    (0.09)    (0.12)    (0.28)    (0.34)   
Second cut-point  -0.67  ***  -0.84 
 
*** 
-0.05    0.31    1.77  ***  1.67  ***  2.04  ***  2.10  *** 
  (0.09)    (0.23)    (0.23)    (0.28)    (0.10)    (0.13)    (0.29)    (0.35)   
Third cut-point  1.63  ***  1.48 
 
*** 
2.54  ***  2.9  ***  3.91  ***  3.81  ***  4.30  ***  4.36  *** 
  (0.09)    (0.23)    (0.23)    (0.28)    (0.17)    (0.19)    (0.32)    (0.38)   
                                 
Country-level 
variance 
0.16  ***  0.13  ***  0.13  ***  0.11  ***  0.15  ***  0.15  ***  0.11  ***  0.11  *** 
                                 
Log-likelihood  -4342.6  -4323.3  -3929.6  -3927.0  -2161.8  -2152.9  -1813.0  -1812.6 
 
*p < . 05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Table A4 for details on the hierarchical structure of the 
data. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 2011. 
 
 
5.4 Multilevel analysis of reproductive uncertainty  
As  for  fertility  intentions,  we  performed  a  multilevel  analysis  of  reproductive 
uncertainty  of  meeting  such  intentions.  The  left  panel  on  Table  4  reports  the 
estimates of the random intercept ordinal regression models (Model I to Model IV) 
run  on  the  childless  sub-sample.  As  can  be  seen,  a  perceived  worsening  in  the 
household‟s  financial  situation  is  positively  associated  with  people‟s  uncertainty. 
This result is robust to the inclusion of background variables: The beta coefficient 
goes from 0.34 in Model II with only perception variables to 0.32 in Model IV with 
all  individual-  and  country-level  variables  and  is  always  highly  statistically 
significant (Table 4). The perception of a worsening in country‟s economic situation Testa and Basten: Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the great recession 
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is  also  positively  correlated  with  reproductive  uncertainty,  but  the  statistical 
significance of the related beta coefficient is very weak (10% level) (see Model III 
and IV in Table 4). Interestingly, the effect of this covariate, as well as its statistical 
significance, increases slightly with the inclusion of the background variables in the 
model (Table A6).  
The right panel on Table 4 reports the estimates of the random intercept ordinal 
regression models on fertility uncertainty run on the sub-sample of people with one 
child. Similar to the childless sub-sample, the effect of a perceived worsening in the 
household‟s financial situation is positively correlated with reproductive uncertainty 
but the effect is very small and not statistically significant, regardless of which and 
how  many  socio-demographic  background  variables  are  included  in  the  models 
(Table A6). However, a positive and statistically significant effect of a perceived 
deterioration in the  household‟s financial situation on reproductive uncertainty is 
observed at the country-level: individuals are more uncertain about meeting their 
fertility  intentions  if  they  live  in  countries  in  which  the  share  of  people  with  a 
pessimistic  view  of  their  household‟s  financial  situation  is  higher.  This  finding 
indicates that the perception effect is exclusively a context effect, and thus most 
likely linked to the worsening economic conditions experienced in the years of the 
start  of  the  recession.  Finally,  a  perceived  worsening  in  the  country‟s  economic 
situation  is  positively  and  statistically  significantly  associated  with  reproductive 
uncertainty but only at 10% (Models II-IV, Table 4). The magnitude of the related 
beta coefficient increases with the increasing number of variables included in the 
models (Table A6).  
To  sum  up,  the  effect  of  people‟s  perception  of  a  worsening  in  their 
household‟s  financial  situation  on  reproductive  uncertainty  is  exerted  only  at 
individual-level at parity zero and only at country-level at parity one: uncertainty 
increases  if  people  make  a  negative  assessment  of  their  household‟s  financial 
situation  (parity  zero),  or  if  they  live  in  country  in  which  many  people  make  a 
negative assessment of their household‟s financial situation (parity one).  
Interaction terms between a perceived worsening in the household‟s financial 
situation, on the one side, and age, employment status, and education, on the other, 
have been tried but not retained in the final models shown in Table 4 as they were 
not statistically significant. This result points out that the effect of this perception 
variable on uncertainty does not change by education, age, and employment status.  
The socio-demographic variables that have a statistically significant effect on 
reproductive  uncertainty  are:  age,  marital  status,  social  status,  and  number  of 
additionally  intended  children.  Uncertainty  is  positively  and  statistically 
significantly associated with age, being single, or separated, and planning more than 
one  child,  while  it  is  negatively  and  statistically  significantly  associated  with 
position in the social scale. These predictors influence reproductive uncertainty of 
both  childless  people  and  people  with  one  child;  however,  being  single  is Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 23 
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statistically significant only  at parity  zero,  while  positioning on  the social  scale, 
being  separated  and  number  of  additionally  intended  children  are  statistically 
significant only at parity one (Table 4). 
The country-level variance goes from 0.30 in the empty model to 0.26 in the 
full models for parity zero, while it goes from 0.10 in the empty model to 0.03 in the 
full  models  for  parity  one.  Moreover,  the  country-level  variance  is  statistically 
significant in all four models at parity zero and in all but the Model IV at parity one. 
This evidence supports the choice of using a random intercept version of the ordinal 
regression models, and it also suggests that the country mean of negative perceptions 
of the  household‟s financial  situation does explain the cross-country variation in 
reproductive uncertainty among people who have just one child. A random slope for 
the perceived household‟s financial situation has been considered. The likelihood 
ratio test comparing the fitting of the two nested models (one with and one without a 
random  slope  on  the  household‟s  financial  situation)  indicated  that  the  model 
containing a random intercept and a random slope did not fit the data better than the 
model containing just a random intercept. This evidence suggests that the effect of a 
perceived  worsening  in  the  household‟s  financial  situation  on  reproductive 
uncertainty does not vary from country to country within the EU.  
 
Table 4:  Estimates from the random intercept ordinal regression models 
on uncertainty about additionally intended number of children. 
Beta coefficients, EU27. 
 
Parity zero: level one units: 2549, level-two units: 27  Parity one: level-one units:1015, level-two units:27 
 
Model I    Model II    Model III    Model IV    Model I    Model II    Model III    Model IV   
Individual’s perception of a worsening in: 
           
   
       
Country economic 
situation 
- 
 
0.15    0.17  +  0.16  +  - 
 
0.21    0.27  +  0.22 
 
      (0.09)    (0.09)    (0.09)        (0.15)    (0.15)    (0.15)   
Household financial 
situation 
- 
 
0.34  ***  0.32  ***  0.32  ***  - 
 
0.11    0.04 
 
0.00 
 
      (0.10)    (0.10)    (0.10)        (0.15)    (0.16)    (0.16)   
Personal job 
situation 
- 
 
0.05    0.03 
 
0.02 
 
- 
 
0.11    0.10 
 
0.09 
 
      (0.11)    (0.11)    (0.11)        (0.15)    (0.16)    (0.16)   
Other individual-level variables   
           
   
       
Age-33 (average)  - 
 
-    0.03  **  0.03  **  - 
 
-    0.04  **  0.04  ** 
          (0.01)    (0.01)            (0.01)    (0.01)   
(Age-33)^2  - 
 
-    0.00 
 
0.00 
 
- 
 
-    0.00 
 
0.00 
 
          (0.00)    (0.00)            (0.00)    (0.00)   
Male (reference) 
   
   
           
   
       
Female   - 
 
-    0.00 
 
0.00 
 
- 
 
-    0.18 
 
0.20 
 
          (0.09)    (0.09)            (0.14)    (0.14)   
Married (reference)   
 
   
       
- 
 
-   
       
Cohabiting  - 
 
-    0.17 
 
0.17 
     
    0.02 
 
0.06 
 
          (0.11)    (0.11)            (0.15)    (0.14)   
Single  - 
 
-    0.62  ***  0.62  ***  - 
 
-    0.23 
 
0.27 
 
          (0.10)    (0.10)            (0.22)    (0.22)   Testa and Basten: Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the great recession 
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Table 4:  (Continued) 
 
Parity zero: level one units: 3496, level-two units: 27  Parity one: level-one units:2053, level-two units:27 
 
Model I    Model II    Model III    Model IV    Model I    Model II    Model III    Model IV   
Separated  - 
 
-    0.72  +  0.73  *  - 
 
-    1.02  **  1.03  ** 
          (0.37)    (0.37)            (0.32)    (0.32)   
Low education (reference)       
           
   
       
Medium education  - 
 
-    -0.16 
 
-0.16 
 
- 
 
-    -0.07 
 
-0.05 
 
          (0.18)    (0.18)            (0.23)    (0.23)   
High education  - 
 
-    -0.17 
 
-0.17 
 
- 
 
-    -0.19 
 
-0.14 
 
          (0.18)    (0.18)            (0.24)    (0.24)   
Enrolled in 
education 
- 
 
-    -0.53  +  -0.52 
 
- 
 
-    0.54 
 
0.62 
 
          (0.31)    (0.31)            (0.54)    (0.54)   
Employed 
(reference) 
                               
Unemployed   -    -    -0.15    -0.15    -    -    -0.04    -0.04   
          (0.13)    (0.13)            (0.19)    (0.19)   
Inactive  -    -    0.43    0.43    -    -    -1.11    -1.12   
          (0.28)    (0.28)            (0.76)    (0.76)   
Inactive * Female  -    -    -0.07    -0.07    -    -    1.03    1.05   
          (0.17)    (0.17)            (0.76)    (0.76)   
Pos. in the social 
scale  
-    -    -0.11    -0.11    -    -    -0.11  *  -0.10  * 
          (0.03)    (0.03)            (0.04)    (0.04)   
One child intended 
(reference) 
                               
Two or more  -    -    0.07    0.07    -    -    0.31  *  0.30  * 
          (0.10)    (0.10)            (0.13)    (0.13)   
Country-means of perceptions                           
Household fin. sit.  -    -    -    -1.10     -    -    -    3.43  * 
              (1.68)                (1.32)   
Personal job sit.  -     -    -     1.94     -     -    -     -2.96   + 
              (1.96)                (1.51)   
First cut-point  -2.14  ***  -1.94  ***  -2.03  ***  -1.88  ***  -1.15  ***  -0.93  ***  -1.57  ***  -1.11  ** 
  (0.12)    (0.14)    (0.29)    (0.37)    (0.10)    (0.14)    (0.36)    (0.40)   
Second cut-point  0.24  *  0.46  ***  0.41    0.56     0.75  ***  0.97  ***  0.39    0.84  * 
  (0.11)    (0.13)    (0.28)    (0.37)    (0.09)    (0.14)    (0.35)    (0.40)   
Third cut-point  1.91  ***  2.14  ***  2.12  ***  2.27  ***  2.59  ***  2.82  ***  2.29  ***  2.74  *** 
  (0.12)    (0.14)    (0.29)    (0.37)    (0.14)    (0.17)    (0.37)    (0.41)   
                                 
Country-level 
variance 
0.30  ***  0.28  ***  0.28  ***  0.26  ***  0.10  **  0.07*    0.09  *  0.03   
                                 
Log-likelihood  -3112.1  -3100.1  -3068.6  -3067.9  -1261.5  -1258.8  -1239.1  -1235.6 
 
*p < . 05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. See Table A4 for details on the hierarchical structure of the 
data. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 2011. 
 
 
6. Discussion  
In this paper we have studied the relationship between people‟s perceived worsening 
in both their resident country‟s and their own economic performance and lifetime Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 23 
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fertility  intentions  in  Europe  in  the  context  of  the  recent  „Great  Recession‟. 
Crucially, we examined both intentions and the certainty of meeting these intentions. 
We expected that a perceived worsening in the country‟s economic situation, the 
household‟s financial situation and personal job situation could be a relevant factors 
in pushing lifetime fertility intentions down and reproductive uncertainty up.  
Descriptive findings have revealed that in the years of the start of economic 
crisis  (2006–2011)  a  decline  in  lifetime  fertility  intentions  occurred  in  Greece 
especially and in the EU27 as a whole among childless people, while uncertainty 
linked to reproductive plans increased in almost all the „SDC countries‟ (with the 
exception of Italy) and was particularly pronounced in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. 
Moreover, subjective evaluations of changes occurred in  the country‟s economic 
situation, the household‟s financial situation, and one‟s personal job situation in the 
years 2006–2011 were quite negative for many people in most of the EU countries. 
Statistical  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  these  pessimistic  views  are  inversely 
correlated with the stated fertility intentions in 2011 and directly correlated with 
reproductive  uncertainty  as  reported  in  2011.  However,  we  could  provide  only 
limited support to our research hypotheses. 
Results  of  random  intercept  ordinal  regression  models  point  out  that  a 
perceived worsening in the household‟s financial situation over the past five years 
(2006–2011)  affects  reproductive  uncertainty  but  not  fertility  intentions  among 
childless people, while it affects only additionally intended number of children but 
not  reproductive  uncertainty  among  people  with  one  child.  As  expected  in 
Hypothesis  I  (see  Section  3),  the  more  pessimistic  individuals  are  about  the 
household‟s past financial situation, the more uncertain they are about the possibility 
of realising their reproductive plans if they have to start a family;  moreover, the 
more pessimistic people are about the household‟s past financial situation, the more 
likely they are to report a smaller additional number of children if they have already 
had one child. This latter effect is, however, only weakly statistically significant. 
Evidently, the choice to have a family with children (at least one child) is normative 
and, as such, is not influenced by financial factors. Hence, if financial conditions are 
perceived  as  deteriorating,  people  reduce  their  intended  family  size  only  if  they 
already have one child. At the initial stage of the reproductive process, employment 
and social status significantly mediate the association between fertility intentions 
and perceived worsening in the household‟s financial situation.  
By  contrast,  people  who  are  at  the  beginning  of  the  reproductive  process 
become very uncertain about the possibility of realising their intended family size if 
they perceive a deterioration of their household‟s financial situation, while they are 
not very responsive to such a perceived deterioration if they have already one child. 
One possible explanation for this result is that people who have already become a 
parent have already learnt with the experience of the first child about the possible 
obstacles  to  realising  their  fertility  plans  and  they  might  have  been  able  to Testa and Basten: Certainty of meeting fertility intentions declines in Europe during the great recession 
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incorporate such obstacles in their reports on intended family size by adjusting them 
downwards and making them – in such a way – more easily to be realised.  
We  could  provide  only  partial  support  for  Hypotheses  II  and  III  because 
country-level  effects  were  observed  only  for  a  perceived  worsening  in  the 
household‟s  financial  situation  in  uncertainty  models  run  on  the  sub-sample  of 
people  at  parity  one.  The  perception  of  a  worsening  in  the  country‟s  economic 
situation did not turn out to be relevant in explaining individual and country-level 
variation,  in  either  fertility  intentions  or  uncertainty  of  meeting  such  intentions. 
Evidently, people‟s fertility preferences are driven by factors more closely related to 
economic conditions and their future perception by the populous.  
The  study  has  some  caveats.  First,  the  effect  of  the  economic  recession  is 
investigated only through people‟s perceptions of worsening economic conditions in 
the country, the household, and for themselves. Second, with only two cross-sections 
we could not relate the perceived worsening in people‟s households‟ situations to 
temporal changes in individual‟s  fertility intentions and reproductive uncertainty. 
Third, the EB data contain only small national samples and question the robustness 
of our results. While recognising that quality of the data  is an issue  for the EB 
surveys, we want to point out that the EBs are the only harmonized data sources 
allowing  a  cross-national  dynamic  comparative  analysis  of  lifetime  fertility 
intentions and uncertainty in all the countries of the European Union. In addition, a 
comparison  between  the  mean  ultimately  intended  family  size  and  the  projected 
cohort  fertility,  as  forecasted  by  Myrskylä,  Goldstein,  and  Cheng  (2012)  for  the 
cohorts born around 1979, has shown that the two measures come very close to each 
other  supporting  the  consistency  and  validity  of  the  information  on  fertility 
intentions provided by the EB surveys (Testa 2012).   
By thus providing empirical evidence that the recent „Great Recession‟ exerted 
only an indirect effect on fertility intentions, via the increasing uncertainty linked to 
the  possibility  of  realising  these  intentions,  we  offer  an  explanation  of  why  the 
economic crisis has been combined with lower fertility levels but not with intentions 
for  smaller  family  size.  However,  we  could  expect  a  declining  trend  in  fertility 
intentions  in  the  future  if  we  assume  that  people  experiencing  a  worsening  in 
economic conditions first become uncertain about the possibility of meeting their 
fertility intentions, and next  – under persistent worsening economic conditions – 
start to revise their initially stated plans downwards.  
Finally, an important observation should be made regarding policy. Bridging 
the „gap‟ between fertility intentions and actualised fertility has been a cornerstone 
of  EU-wide  family  policy  since  the  era  of  low-  and  lowest-low  fertility  across 
Europe (NIDI 2010). While fertility intentions have declined in some settings – and 
could decline in others – if the „gap‟ becomes smaller it will more likely be as a 
result of a lack of supporting social and family policy rather than as a consequence 
of „bridging the gap.‟ Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 23 
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Appendix 
Table A1:  Variables used in the multivariate analysis. Values in percent 
unless stated otherwise. 
Panel a)   Intentions analysis – Table 3 (N cases: Parity 0=3,496; Parity 
1=2,053)  
   Parity 0  Parity 1 
      No child intended   20  48 
Only child intended  15  37 
Two children intended  48  13 
Three or more children intended  17  2 
     
Average age (years)  28.6  34.2 
      Female   45  62 
Male  55  38 
      Married   15  62 
Cohabiting  25  18 
Single  54  11 
Separated  6  9 
      Low education  6  10 
Medium education  39  53 
High education  35  36 
Enrolled in education  20  1 
      Employed  64  74 
Unemployed   12  13 
Inactive  24  13 
      Self-positioning on the social scale (average)  5.77  5.55 
     
One additional child intended  19  29 
Two or more children intended  81  71 
     
% of people perceived a worsening in: 
    Country economic situation  73  75 
Household’s financial situation  32  39 
Personal job situation  25  32 
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Table A1:   (Continued) 
Panel b)   Uncertainty analysis – Table 4 (N. cases: Parity 0=2549; Parity 
1=1015) 
   Parity 0  Parity 1 
      Reproductive uncertainty     
Very sure  11  24 
Fairly sure  44  43 
Not very sure  31  26 
Not at all sure  14  7 
     
Average age (years)  27.2  31.1 
      Female   44  59 
Male  56  41 
      Married   14  62 
Cohabiting  27  24 
Single  53  10 
Separated  6  4 
      Low education  5  8 
Medium education  37  48 
High education  35  42 
Enrolled in education  23  2 
      Employed  63  74 
Unemployed   12  13 
Inactive  25  13 
      Self-positioning on the social scale (average)  5.85  5.65 
     
% of people perceived a worsening in: 
    Country’s economic situation  69  75 
Household’s financial situation  31  34 
Personal job situation  24  30 
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Table A2:  Structure of the data used in the descriptive analysis shown in 
Table 1: respondents aged 20 to 45 by country and parity, EU27. 
   Parity 0 
 
Parity 1 
   2006  2011 
 
2006  2011 
            Austria  184  174    115  75 
Belgium  166  149    75  71 
Bulgaria  128  104    145  107 
Cyprus  39  98    17  24 
Czech Rep.  146  145    110  101 
Denmark  148  122    56  57 
Estonia  76  115    82  95 
Finland  108  91    62  44 
France  132  123    82  76 
Germany  227  227    114  102 
Greece  250  209    65  68 
Hungary  108  130    74  95 
Ireland  105  96    58  73 
Italy  245  169    95  83 
Latvia  110  151    101  147 
Lithuania  106  141    91  82 
Luxembourg  49  72    31  43 
Malta  49  48    19  33 
Netherlands  113  164    58  41 
Poland  130  95    76  67 
Portugal  105  119    82  99 
Romania  104  135    101  126 
Slovakia  152  125    108  89 
Slovenia  197  137    90  67 
Spain  160  177    72  86 
Sweden  93  85    42  49 
United Kingdom  168  155    92  96 
            EU27  3598  3556    2113  2096 
 
Note. Samples used in the analysis shown in Table 1.  
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 2006 and 2011. 
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Table A3:  Structure of the data used in the descriptive analysis shown in 
Table 2: respondents aged 20 to 45 by country and parity, EU27. 
   Parity 0 
 
Parity 1 
   2006  2011 
 
2006  2011 
           
Austria  87  91    38  27 
Belgium  122  109    36  37 
Bulgaria  83  79    60  39 
Cyprus  33  70    13  11 
Czech Rep.  123  123    56  54 
Denmark  118  93    38  37 
Estonia  62  99    49  67 
Finland  82  69    44  23 
France  107  99    54  51 
Germany  134  141    35  42 
Greece  226  176    39  35 
Hungary  89  91    47  40 
Ireland  60  60    38  50 
Italy  167  113    38  34 
Latvia  80  127    60  77 
Lithuania  89  120    47  48 
Luxembourg  35  40    8  18 
Malta  25  27    6  8 
Netherlands  59  102    29  23 
Poland  110  73    45  30 
Portugal  78  90    35  33 
Romania  90  94    44  42 
Slovakia  105  103    49  34 
Slovenia  175  114    51  32 
Spain  111  125    32  50 
Sweden  71  59    29  27 
United Kingdom  111  94    35  60 
           
EU27  2632  2581    1057  1029 
 
Note. Samples used in the analysis shown in Table 2.  
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 2006 and 2011: sub-sample of respondents with positive fertility 
intentions. 
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Table A4:  Structure of the data used in the multilevel regression analysis 
shown in Table 3 and Table 4: respondents aged 20 to 45 by 
country and parity, EU27. 
   Intentions analysis 
 
Certainty analysis 
   Parity 0  Parity 1 
 
Parity 0  Parity 1 
           
Austria  168  70    88  25 
Belgium  149  71    109  37 
Bulgaria  103  103    78  38 
Cyprus  94  22    66  10 
Czech Rep.  139  98    119  52 
Denmark  122  57    93  37 
Estonia  115  95    99  67 
Finland  91  44    69  23 
France  122  76    98  51 
Germany  223  102    138  42 
Greece  206  65    174  35 
Hungary  129  94    91  40 
Ireland  88  70    59  49 
Italy  167  80    112  33 
Latvia  149  147    126  77 
Lithuania  140  81    119  47 
Luxembourg  71  41    40  18 
Malta  48  33    27  8 
Netherlands  162  37    101  20 
Poland  89  65    70  30 
Portugal  117  95    89  33 
Romania  133  125    93  42 
Slovakia  125  89    103  34 
Slovenia  134  65    111  32 
Spain  176  86    125  50 
Sweden  84  49    59  27 
United Kingdom  152  93    93  58 
            EU27  3496  2053     2549  1015 
 
Note. Samples used in the multilevel analysis shown in Tables 3 and 4.  
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer  2011. 
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Table A5:  Random intercept ordinal regression models on intended family 
size. 
Panel a)  Parity zero: 3496 individuals (aged 20-45), EU27 
Country economic situation  -0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.05 
  Household financial situation  -0.20 *  -0.20  *  -0.20 *  -0.19 *  -0.19 *  -0.16 +  -0.12 
  Personal job situation  -0.31 ***  -0.15 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.05 
  Age 33 (average) 
  
-0.16  ***  -0.16 ***  -0.16 ***  -0.15 ***  -0.15 ***  -0.15 *** 
(Age_33)^2 
  
-0.01  ***  -0.01 ***  -0.01 ***  -0.01 ***  -0.01 ***  -0.01 *** 
Male (reference)  
                      Female 
      
-0.13 *  -0.14 *  -0.17 *  -0.20 *  -0.21 ** 
Married (reference) 
                       Single 
          
-0.11 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.11 
  Cohabiting 
           
0.08 
 
0.08 
 
0.07 
 
0.09 
  Separated 
           
-0.29 
 
-0.27 
 
-0.26 
 
-0.25 
  Low education (reference) 
                       Medium education 
               
0.13 
 
0.05 
 
0.01 
  High education 
               
0.35 *  0.24 
 
0.17 
  Enrolled in education 
               
0.49 ***  1.45 ***  1.31 *** 
Employed (reference) 
                         Unemployed 
                  
-0.21 
 
-0.16 
  Inactive 
                  
-1.24 ***  -1.15 *** 
Female * Inactive 
                   
0.26 
 
0.25 
  Positioning in the social scale 
                  
0.09 *** 
First cut-point  -1.65 ***  -1.53  ***  -1.58 ***  -1.61 ***  -1.40 ***  -1.56 ***  -1.06 *** 
Second cut-point  -0.84 ***  -0.53  ***  -0.59 ***  -0.61 ***  -0.40 *  -0.55 ***  -0.05 
  Third cut-point  1.48 ***  2.03  ***  1.97 ***  1.95 ***  2.17 ***  2.03 ***  2.54 *** 
Country level variance  0.19 ***  0.13  ***  0.13 ***  0.13 ***  0.12 ***  0.13 ***  0.13 *** 
Log-likelihood  -4323.3  -3970  -3968  -3964  -3955  -3937  -3930 
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Table A5:  (Continued) 
Panel b)   Parity one: 2053 individuals (aged 20-45), EU27 
Country economic situation  0.04 
 
0.00 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
  Household financial situation  -0.41 ***  -0.38  ***  -0.35 *  -0.29 *  -0.28 *  -0.26 *  -0.23 + 
Personal job situation  0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.07 
 
0.04 
 
0.05 
  Age 33 (average) 
  
-0.16  ***  -0.17 ***  -0.17 ***  -0.17 ***  -0.17 ***  -0.17 *** 
(Age_33)^2 
  
-0.01  ***  -0.01 ***  -0.01 ***  -0.01 ***  -0.01 ***  -0.01 *** 
Male (reference)  
                      Female 
      
-0.57 ***  -0.52 ***  -0.57 ***  -0.60 ***  -0.60 *** 
Married (reference) 
                      Single 
         
-0.38 *  -0.32 *  -0.33 *  -0.31 
  Cohabiting 
         
0.15 
 
0.17 
 
0.17 
 
0.18 
  Separated 
         
-0.88 ***  -0.82 ***  -0.83 ***  -0.81 *** 
Low education (reference) 
                     Medium education 
            
0.31 
 
0.28 
 
0.26 
  High education 
            
0.86 ***  0.83 ***  0.78 *** 
Enrolled in education 
            
1.46 ***  1.75 ***  1.72 *** 
Employed (reference) 
                      Unemployed 
               
0.11 
 
0.15 
  Inactive 
               
-1.08 +  -1.09 + 
Female * Inactive 
               
1.04 +  1.05 + 
Positioning in the social scale 
               
0.07 * 
First cut-point  -0.22 *  -0.78  ***  -1.14 ***  -1.18 ***  -0.65 ***  -0.69 ***  -0.33 
  Second cut-point  1.67 ***  1.48  ***  1.15 ***  1.14 ***  1.71 ***  1.67 ***  2.04 *** 
Third cut-point  3.81 ***  3.70  ***  3.38 ***  3.38 ***  3.97 ***  3.93 ***  4.30 *** 
Country level variance  0.15 ***  0.14  ***  0.14 ***  0.15 ***  0.11 ***  0.11 ***  0.11 *** 
Log-likelihood  -2153  -1871  -1854  -1839  -1817  -1815  -1813 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 2011 
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Table A6:  Random intercept ordinal regression models on reproductive 
uncertainty. 
Panel a)   Parity zero: 2549 individuals (aged 20-45), EU27 
Country economic 
situation  0.15 
 
0.16  +  0.16  +  0.17  +  0.17  +  0.17  +  0.17  +  0.17  + 
Household fin. 
situation  0.34  ***  0.34  ***  0.34  ***  0.33  ***  0.33  ***  0.34  ***  0.32  ***  0.32  *** 
Personal job 
situation  0.05 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
  Age  
   
0.03  **  0.03  **  0.03  **  0.03  **  0.03  **  0.03  **  0.03  ** 
(Age_33)^2 
   
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
  Gender (reference: male)  
                              Female 
       
-0.04 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
  Married (reference) 
                                Single 
           
0.61 
 
0.61 
 
0.62 
 
0.62 
 
0.62 
  Cohabiting 
           
0.17 
 
0.17 
 
0.17 
 
0.17 
 
0.17 
  Separated 
           
0.74  *  0.73  *  0.72  *  0.71 
 
0.71 
  Low education (reference) 
                              Medium education 
               
-0.18 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.15 
  High education 
               
-0.21 
 
-0.19 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.17 
  Enrolled in 
education 
               
-0.15 
 
-0.57 
 
-0.52 
 
-0.52 
  Employed (reference) 
                              Unemployed 
                   
-0.14 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.15 
  Inactive 
                   
0.45 
 
0.42 
 
0.43 
  Female * Inactive 
                   
-0.07 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.06 
  Pos. in the social scale 
                   
-0.03 
 
-0.04 
  One child int. (reference) 
                              Two or more children 
                         
0.07 
  First cut-point  -1.94  ***  -2.00  ***  -2.02  ***  -1.72  ***  -1.90  ***  -1.88  ***  -2.08  ***  -2.03  *** 
Second cut-point  0.46  ***  0.40  ***  0.38  **  0.71  ***  0.52  *  0.55  *  0.35 
 
0.41 
  Third cut-point  2.14  ***  2.09  ***  2.07  ***  2.42  ***  2.24  ***  2.27  ***  2.07  ***  2.12  *** 
Country level 
variance  0.28  ***  0.28  ***  0.28  ***  0.27  ***  0.28  ***  0.27  ***  0.28  ***  0.28  *** 
Log-likelihood  -3100.1  -3095.9  -3095.7  -3072.5  -3071.8  -3069.6  -3068.8  -3068.6 
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Table A6:  (Continued) 
Panel b)   Parity one: 1015 individuals (aged 20-45), EU27 
Country economic 
situation 
0.21 
 
0.23 
 
0.24 
 
0.26 +  0.28  +  0.28 +  0.29  +  0.27 + 
Household fin. 
situation 
0.11 
 
0.12 
 
0.11 
 
0.10 
 
0.09 
 
0.10 
 
0.04 
 
0.04 
 
Personal job situation  0.11 
 
0.12 
 
0.12 
 
0.12 
 
0.11 
 
0.11 
 
0.11 
 
0.10 
 
Age  
  
0.03 *  0.03 **  0.03 **  0.04  **  0.04 **  0.04  **  0.04 ** 
(Age_33)^2 
  
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
Gender (reference: male)  
                        
Female 
     
0.20 
 
0.16 
 
0.18 
 
0.17 
 
0.17 
 
0.18 
 
Married (reference) 
                         
Single 
        
0.33 
 
0.29 
 
0.27 
 
0.24 
 
0.23 
 
Cohabiting 
        
0.05 
 
0.05 
 
0.04 
 
0.03 
 
0.02 
 
Separated 
        
1.06 **  1.04  **  1.03 **  1.01  **  1.02 ** 
Low education (reference) 
                        
Medium education 
           
-0.11 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.07 
 
High education 
           
-0.25 
 
-0.24 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.19 
 
Enrolled in education 
           
0.28 
 
0.64 
 
0.65 
 
0.54 
 
Employed (reference) 
                         
Unemployed 
               
0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.04 
 
Inactive 
               
-1.18 
 
-1.13 
 
-1.11 
 
Female * Inactive 
               
1.09 
 
1.05 
 
1.03 
 
Pos. in the social 
scale                    
-0.11  *  -0.11 ** 
One child int. (reference) 
                        
Two or more children 
                      
0.31 * 
First cut-point  -0.93 ***  -0.98 ***  -0.87 ***  -0.81 ***  -0.97  ***  -0.98 ***  -1.60  ***  -1.57 *** 
Second cut-point  0.97 ***  0.94 ***  1.05 ***  1.12 ***  0.96  ***  0.96 ***  0.35 
 
0.39 
 
Third cut-point  2.82 ***  2.80 ***  2.91 ***  3.01 ***  2.85  ***  2.85 ***  2.25  ***  2.29 *** 
Country level 
variance 
0.07 *  0.08 *  0.08 *  0.09 **  0.09  *  0.08 *  0.08  *  0.09 * 
Log-likelihood  -1259  -1255  -1254  -1248  -1246  -1245  -1242  -1239.1 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Eurobarometer 2011. 
 
 